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Introduction
The aging of the populations in the OECD countries has prompted various calls for reforming the existing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems. Almost all European Union countries are already implementing reforms to minimize the …scal burden of the demographic shock on the individuals. Similar reform proposals are also being discussed for the United States economy. In 2001, a President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security was appointed to formulate proposals that would help maintain the current PAYG system's bene…ts for current retirees while improving the future pensions of current workers through 'personal security accounts'. The Commission proposed three plans. The …rst plan only recommended that workers make a voluntary contribution out of their social security payroll taxes into a Personal Security Account (PSA), owned and managed by the worker and invested in a well-diversi…ed portfolio. The second plan extended this idea further and recommended diverting 4 percentage points of the social security payroll tax to PSAs while reducing the indexation of current pension by following price increases as opposed to wage increases. The third plan introduces a mix of add-on and carve-out approach such that a worker who chooses to voluntarily invest an additional 1 percent of earned income may divert 2.5 percent of social security payroll taxes, up to $1,000 annually, to PSAs. Al-though plans 2 and 3 are clearly partial privatization plans, both plans also guarantee 30-year minimum-wage workers a retirement income above the poverty line. All 3 plans have the accounts owned by the participants and these accounts can be bequeathed to heirs.
The current debate on social security reform in the U.S. has therefore focused on the relative merits of the existing PAYG system versus some form of partial privatization with a safety net for low income workers. In its key features, the 2001 Commission's proposals are similar to the reform recommendations made by the 1997 Advisory Council on Social Security, according to which there were three approaches formulated to solve the long-term …nancial imbalance in the program: 1 Maintain Bene…ts: keep them essentially as is, but tax them.
Individual Accounts: an additional and mandatory contribution of 1.6% of payroll.
Personal Security Accounts: Convert the current system to a basic, ‡at bene…t program, and 5% of the existing payroll tax redirected to PSAs. 1 The organization of the 'Council' has since changed. Now there is a Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB), an independent, bipartisan board created by Congress and appointed by the President and the Congress to advise on matters related to the Social Security and Supplemental Security Inocme Programs. Its most recent report in 2003 suggest acting as soon as possible to reform the system.
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All these political e¤orts are attempts to change the current PAYG de…ned bene…ts program administered publicly into a two-tiered program with a …rst-tier ‡at basic pension …nanced in a PAYG manner, plus a privately managed de…ned contribution program. In the current de…ned bene…t system, individuals are given insurance against life span risk as they receive retirement bene…ts as long as they are alive. On the other hand, a switch to a de…ned contribution retirement program can be designed to provide the same insurance if the funds in the individuals'accounts are required to be annuitized. However, as Diamond (1998) points out, political feasibility necessitates that the accounts'of the deceased be transferred to their estates.
Clearly, setting the rules about the distribution of the accounts of workers who die before reaching retirement age is not a trivial task. 2 A de…ned contribution plan must also specify rules about how the funds are withdrawn during retirement. There are several options: 1) the accumulations in PSAs are used to …nance real annuities, 2) lump-sum withdrawals 2 Boskin (1986) proposed a de…ned contribution plan where individuals' accounts are mandatorily annuitized. His suggestion was to separate retirement policies into two parts; the annuity part would provide actuarily equivalent insurance for retirement annuities, disability, and catastrophic hospital care, where as the welfare (or transfer) part would guarantee a minimally adequate level of retirement income to all citizens. Huggett and Ventura (1999) studied the steady-state e¤ects of a Boskin type reform. Their treatment of the reform mimics the Boskin proposal and is quite di¤erent from the PSAs suggested above. First, the annuity part is …nanced in a PAYG basis. Second, bene…ts are set equal to the maximum of the ‡oor bene…t and the annuity part of the Boskin proposal. The ‡oor bene…t is proportional to output per worker, which is similar to the PSA reform. The social security tax rate that …nances the annuity part is set equal to the actual U.S. social security tax rate. 4 are made, or 3) a combination of the …rst two whereby phased withdrawals are made according to some formula and the remaining amount required to be annuitized. The Advisory Council in 1997 made two proposals for a de…ned contribution system that di¤ered in the way that bene…ts are paid to individuals. On the one hand, the PSA proposal places no restriction on the form of bene…t receipt. An intermediate position is the Chilean system where there is a limit in the size of monthly withdrawals for any part of the retirement account that is not annuitized.
As we mentioned above, Diamond (1998) argues that mandatory annuitization may not be the best option on how funds are withdrawn during retirement if individuals care about leaving bequests to their descendents.
Regulation about how to withdraw funds during retirement is also not a trivial issue if the individuals face binding borrowing constraints. Clearly, establishing such rules are an integral part of the design mechanism for reforming social security.
In this paper, we quantitatively evaluate the welfare e¤ects of reforming social security by introducing a PSA with and without mandatory annuitization in an economic environment with bequests and borrowing constraints.
Our setup allows us to assess whether mandatory saving or mandatory annuitization of accumulated PSA wealth at retirement is welfare enhancing, 
Demographics and Endowments
Our setup is a stationary overlapping generations model where every period For each period, individuals are endowed with one unit of time which they supply inelastically to …rms as labor hours. Uncertainty at the individual level is introduced by a random variable z 2 Z = fH; Lg that determines lifetime labor ability; z is a two-state, …rst-order Markov process with the transition probability matrix
where ij = Prfz 0 = j j z = ig; z is the labor ability of the father and z 0 is the labor ability of the new born in the dynasty .
The realization of the ability shock determines two features of an individual's lifetime opportunities. First, z determines the individual's age-
If z = H; the individual enjoys a permanently higher labor productivity throughout his life-span than an individual with z = L: Second, the realization of the labor ability shock determines an individual's life expectancy. We will use j (z) to denote the probability of surviving to age j + 1 conditional on having survived to age j for an individual with ability z for age j = 1; 2; : : : ; 2T; where 2T (z) = 0 and z 2 fH; Lg:
In order to develop economic intuition about how the model works, it is important to note that there are no private insurance markets in the economy to diversify the risk of being born as a low ability-type individual. However, the informal family structure and some partial annuities, public or privately administered if they exist, do provide some partial insurance against this type of shock.
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Cohorts shares are time invariant due to our assumptions of constant conditional survival probabilities and population growth rate n. Using 1 (z) = (z)(1 + n) T to indicate the size of cohort 1 (newborns) with ability z; relative to that of cohort (T + 1) (parents), where (1 + n) T is the number of children per parent and (z) is the measure of newborn individuals with ability z; we can obtain the relative sizes of the other generations recursively:
(1 + n) ; j = 1; : : : ; 2T 1:
Technology
There is a representative …rm which rents capital, K; and hires labor, N;
to produce a single good using a Cobb-Douglas production function
, where 2 (0; 1) is the output share of capital, Y t is output at time t, K t is aggregate capital input at time t; N t is aggregate labor input at time t; and A t is an exogenous labor-augmenting technological progress growing at a constant rate . Capital depreciates at a constant rate 2 (0; 1): Firms maximize pro…ts so that factor prices are set equal to marginal products
(1)
where e r t is the rental price of capital and ! t is the wage per e¤ective labor.
Social Security and Fiscal Policy 2.3.1 Personal Security Accounts without Annuitization
Under a PSA system, retirement bene…ts come from two distinct sources.
The …rst tier is a ‡at pension bene…t equal to 18 percent of per capita GDP (a monthly payment of $410 in 1996). This portion of the total bene…t is …nanced in a pay-as-you-go fashion by taxing current labor income. Hence, the social security tax rate that …nances the …rst-tier system is set such that its aggregate revenue equals the aggregate …rst-tier bene…ts:
where b denotes the ‡at bene…t, s is the social security payroll tax to …nance the …rst-tier bene…ts. We can obtain the following close form solution for the equilibrium tax rate by substituting b = 0:18y and y = !N=(1 ) in the above equation:
The second tier of retirement bene…ts is …nanced by forced saving. Every period, the individual deposits 5 percent of earnings in PSAs. These funds are owned and managed by the individuals, invested in the capital market and therefore earns the rate of return on capital, and cannot be withdrawn until the individual retires. The capital income accumulated in the PSA is not taxed during the individual's working life. The amount of second tier bene…ts is determined by the wealth accumulated in these tax-favored personal security accounts. 3 These assumptions de…ne the following law of motion of the PSA (for an individual of ability z)
where = 0:05; s j+1 (z) denotes the PSA funds of an age-j + 1 individual with ability z and s 1 (z) = 0: At retirement the individual gets a lumpsum transfer of the wealth accumulated in his account which amounts to
(1 + e r)s R (z). If the individual does not survive to his retirement, his PSA funds are transferred to his estate. Note that this reform is essentially a partial privatization achieved by a mandatory saving program.
Personal Security Accounts with Mandatory Annuitization
In a modi…ed version of the above reform, we consider the case of partial privatization in which the funds accumulated in PSA are annuitized by the institution managing the PSAs. At retirement, individuals are entitled to an annuity payment, b(z); which we assume to be proportional to the wealth accumulated in the PSA at retirement, that is, b(z) = p(1 + e r)s R (z); where the proportion p is determined endogenously as we explain below: The annuity payment remains constant during retirement, just like the …rst-tier ‡at PAYG bene…t.
In order to compute the annuity payment of each individual, the social security system has to determine the proportion p of accumulated wealth that the individual receives during retirement. This variable p is set such that, the expected present value of the aggregate annuity payments of the generation that retires today equals the aggregate wealth held in PSA (the funds of individuals that are alive at retirement plus the funds of individuals that die before reaching retirement). 4 The expected present value of the 4 Notice that, p is computed for the generation that retires in a given period and that 13 aggregate annuity payments across individuals that retire today is given by
the aggregate wealth accumulated in PSA by individuals, in this cohort, that survived to retirement,
i (z) and the aggregate wealth of individuals who died before retirement is
As a result, the proportion p the de…nes the annuity payments must satisfy the following condition:
The above condition implies that the return of annuities is linked to the average mortality rate across individuals with di¤erential mortality (high and low ability individuals) and, as a result, the return of annuities is not fair.
This return could not be o¤ered by private annuities since it would not be accepted by individuals with high mortality rate (low ability). In contrast, the government can provide this return because annuities are mandatory.
we do not index p by time because we are assuming a stationary equilibrium.
In other words, the government can overcome an adverse selection problem (private information on di¤erential mortality) in the annuity market because PSA are mandatory annuitized.
The law of motion of the aggregate wealth held in PSA by the social security system is
denotes the aggregate annuity payments at period t; if they were given the option. At each period t; the aggregate funds in PSA, W t are invested in the capital market.
Government Budget
In addition to the administration of the pension system, the government taxes labor income, capital income and consumption in order to …nance exogenously given government purchases. We assume that the government's budget is balanced each period. Since tax rates and government expenditure are exogenous, the budget is balanced by an endogenous lump-sum transfer to the individuals. The government also collects the asset holdings and capital income of individuals that die without descendents. These resources 15 are transferred in a lump-sum fashion to all survivors. 5 
Preferences
The preference structure in our setup follows Laitner (1992)'s two-sided altruistic speci…cation in which individuals derive utility from their own lifetime consumption and from the felicity of their predecessors and descendants. This framework allows us to evaluate the annuity role of various social security institutions when families can also provide annuity insurance to their members. Furthermore, in this setup, strategic behavior between the father and the children does not arise because their decisions maximize the same objective function. Therefore, due to this commonality of interests during the periods when their lives overlap , the father and the children constitute a single decision unit by pooling their resources. We call this decision unit a 'household' which is constituted by an adult male, the father, of generation j and age T + 1; and his m = (1 + n) T adult children of generation j + T and age 1. A household survives T periods or until the father and the children have died. 6 A dynasty consists of a sequence of households that belong to the same family line. If the children survive to age T + 1, each of them becomes a father in the 'next-generation household'
of the same dynasty. Otherwise, the family line is broken, and this dynasty is over. Since the population experiences broken dynasties every period, we assume that these dynasties are replaced by new dynasties to maintain our assumption of a stationary demographic structure. Since mortality rates are higher for low ability individuals, the number of new dynasties of low ability is higher than the number of dynasties of high ability. A new dynasty begins with an individual of age 1 that holds zero assets. The budget constraint facing an age-j household, where j = 1; 2; : : : ; T 1 is the age of the youngest member(s), is given by
where s is an indicator function which takes the value m if the children are alive and 0 otherwise, while f is an indicator function that takes the value unity if the father is alive and 0 otherwise; h 2 f1; 2; 3g is an indicator of household composition, r = e r ; e j (h; z; z 0 ) are the after tax earnings, c j is the consumption of each household member; a j denotes the asset holdings to be carried over to age j + 1; 1 is the lump sum redistribution of unintended bequests left behind by fathers without sons and con…scated by the government, 2 is a lump sum transfer to balance the government's budget, and c and k denote the consumption and capital income tax rates, respectively. All per capita aggregate quantities reported in the paper are divided by the level of the technology, A t ; and therefore represented in e¢ ciency units. As we restrict attention to steady-states, consumption, asset holdings, lump-sum transfers, and earnings are in e¢ ciency units and constant over time.
We represent the net of tax earnings of an age-j household with the function e j (h; z; z 0 ):
where s is the …rst-tier social security tax rate, `i s the personal tax rate on labor income, and is the rate of mandatory saving. For the PAYG pension system, B j+T (z) denotes the pension at age j +T , which depends on average lifetime earnings calculated using the wage at the retirement period, that is, For j = T; the budget constraint of the household is given by
If the children survive to age T , (1 + n) T new households are constituted in the dynasty and each of them will hold a T assets. If the children do not survive to age T; the family line breaks.
The above budget constraints are designed for the PAYG social security system, with the additional assumption of = 0: To represent PSAs, we need to take = 0:05; and add (1 + e r)s R (z) to the right hand side of the budget for the …rst year of retirement, and also keep track of the accumulation of
PSA wealth through equation (3).
It is assumed that households face borrowing constraints and cannot hold negative assets at any age:
Individuals obtain utility from their consumption and from their predecessors and descendents consumption. We restrict the utility function to 20 the CRRA class because we assume a balanced growth path for our economy. We will use the language of recursive economic theory to describe the household's decision problem.
Let V j (a; h; z; z 0 ) denote the maximized value of expected, discounted lifetime utility of an age-j household with the state vector (a; h; z; z 0 ): For a household of age j T;
subject to (4)- (7), where is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and
P 3 h 0 =1 j (h; h 0 ; z; z 0 )V j+1 (a 0 ; h 0 ; z; z 0 ) for j = 1; 2; : : : ; T 1;
T (z 0 )(1 + n) T P z 00 2fH;Lg z 0 z 00 V 1 (a 0 ; 3; z 0 ; z 00 ) for j = T; j (h; h 0 ; z; z 0 ) is the probability that a household of age j and type h becomes type h 0 the next period given that the father is of ability z and the children of ability z 0 . 7 
Steady State Equilibrium
A …scal policy is a set fG; B; `; k ; c ; s ; g: Given …scal policy, a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of value functions fV j (a; h; z; z 0 )g T j=1 ;
households'decision rules fc j ( ); a j ( )g T j=1 ; time invariant measures of households fX j (a; h; z; z 0 )g T j=1 ; relative prices of labor and capital f!; rg; a lump sum distribution of unintended bequests 1 , and a lump-sum government transfer 2 such that the following conditions are satis…ed:
1. given …scal policy, prices and lump-sum transfers, households'decision rules solve households'decision problem (8); 2. …rms maximize pro…ts, i.e. (1) and (2) hold;
3. aggregation holds, e K = X j;a;h;z;z 0 a j 1 (a; h; z; z 0 )X j (a; h; z; z 0 )(1 + n) 1 j + W;
is the aggregate PSA wealth in the economy, adjusted for growth;
4. the set of age-dependent measures of households satis…es
= X fa;h:a 0 =a j (a;h;z;z 0 )g X j (a; h; z; z 0 ) j (h; h 0 ; z; z 0 ); for j = 1; :::; T 1;
the invariant distribution of age-1 households is given by conditions
and
that is, new dynasties, holding zero assets, substitute for the family lines broken during any given period;
5. the lump-sum redistribution of unintended bequests satis…es
6. the government's budget is balanced
7. the …rst-tier social security tax rate is such that the budget of the social security system is balanced
8. the goods market clears
Calibration and Solution
We are going to calibrate our model economy to the long run quantities in the U.S. economy in order to conduct our counterfactual experiments for reforming social security. Our main calibration target is the average capitaloutput ratio in the U.S. economy over the last …fty years, 2.5. Table 1 shows the major modeling and calibration choices made. years. The population growth rate is 1.2% per year, and the productivity growth rate is 1.65% annually. Again, these are the averages from the U.S.
economy over the last …fty years. The depreciation rate is taken as 4.4%, and capital's share of GNP is 31%.
Fiscal policy is captured by a constant annual government-GNP ratio of 18%, and taxes on labor income, capital income, and consumption, at 20%, 40%, and 5%, respectively.
The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is set equal to 2, and the subjective discount factor is taken as 0.988 in order to obtain a capital-output ratio of 2.5. 8 4 Numerical Findings
Aggregate Long Run E¤ects
We summarize the long-run e¤ects of various types of reform in Table 2 . The benchmark steady-state describes the current U.S. economy where pensions are provided by a PAYG system with a replacement rate of 44% and a payroll tax rate of 9.44%. We set the values of aggregate variables in this steadystate equilibrium equal to 100 for easy comparison with other steady-state equilibria under alternative reform proposals. The steady-state labeled 'Elimination' is an equilibrium where there is no unfunded system at all and all individuals are left free to save the optimal amounts desired to support old-age consumption. The steady-states labeled 'PSA+Annuity'and 'PSA'enforce mandatory saving at the rate of 5% of individuals'gross wage income in each of the years during their working life. Not surprisingly, all three alternative steady-states exhibit higher capital stock than the benchmark economy since the distortion on saving is reduced with the decline of the payroll tax from 9.44% to 4.38%. Perhaps surprisingly, the steady-states with mandatory saving yield higher aggregate capital and consumption than the fully privatized equilibrium. This might be due to the fact that the combination of the two tiers for retirement con-sumption under the PSA reforms with mandatory saving programs yields a higher aggregate saving rate than the steady-state in which there is no social security system. Table 3 shows the lifetime utility of newborn households for di¤erent composition and ability types. The …rst row describes the welfare of households at the benchmark steady-state. The second and third raws show the welfare levels under the partial privatization proposals, and the last row depicts the welfare of households under full privatization. First, these households have no fathers who would generate the demand for annuity insurance, and since these households are very young they would rather not be subject to forced saving. Second, they might be facing binding liquidity constraints and mandatory saving would then reduce their welfare.
Welfare E¤ects
Another way to get the same intuition is to compare their lifetime welfare under the two PSA reforms. They prefer the one without annuitization for the same reasons listed above. In addition, type 1 households prefer the PSA reform to the PAYG benchmark.
For type 3 households, the proposed PSA reform bene…ts those with low preference for annuity insurance. In particular, the households with low life expectancy fathers (LL and LH households) are better o¤, where as households with long life expectancy fathers (HH and HL households) are worse o¤, relative to the benchmark PAYG social security system.
A great majority of type 3 households prefer to be born into the steadystate labeled 'PSA+Annuity'where there is mandatory saving at the 5% rate and wealth generated by this partial privatization program is annuitized at retirement. 9 This …nding might seem surprising since our households care about leaving bequests to their relatives. However, since fathers are alive in these households, they like to hold annuities and therefore mandatory annuitization does not lower their welfare. Moreover, the fathers are very close to retirement age and the timing of annuitization is also in line with the households' desire to hold annuities to insure the soon-to-be retirees. The HL households prefer the PAYG system. These households bene…t from the progressivity of the PAYG system because of the low ability son, and the and they also receive a generous pension for the high ability father.
The proposed PSA reform bene…ts LH and LL type households and hurts HH and HL type households, relative to the benchmark equilibrium. This may be due to the fact that PSA does not provide annuity insurance against lifespan uncertainty while PAYG social security does so in the benchmark equilibrium. In fact, under PSA and mandatory annuitization, all ability types but HL enjoy higher lifetime welfare than in the benchmark economy.
To see how type 1 households feel about the proposed reforms, Table 4 calculates the rate of return to 'social security'for H and L types. 10 In both steady-states with PSAs, the expected return on social security at birth is higher than the after tax return on capital. In the case of PSA without annuitization, there is some progressivity in the bene…ts since there is a …rst-tier which is a ‡at bene…t for every retiree. Indeed, the expected return of social security is higher for individuals with low ability (5.41%) than for the H types (5.10%). This di¤erence between the returns for low and high ability households disappears when part of the retirement wealth is annuitized. In this case, high ability households enjoy a higher rate of return (5.51%) than low ability households (5.49%) because H types have a longer life expectancy than L types. Therefore, when the part of wealth generated by mandatory saving is annuitized at retirement, a rationale for introducing a ‡at …rst tier pension is to compensate low ability individuals for the fact that their expected life is shorter.
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Conclusions
The current debate on social security reform in the U.S. has focused on the relative merits of the existing PAYG system versus some form of partial privatization with a safety net for low income workers. In its key features, Maintain Bene…ts: keep them essentially as is, but tax them.
Personal Security Accounts: Convert the current system to a basic, ‡at bene…t program, and 5% of the existing payroll tax redirected to PSAs.
There is serious discussion to change the current PAYG de…ned bene…ts program administered publicly into a two-tiered program with a …rst-tier ‡at basic pension …nanced in a PAYG manner, plus a privately managed de…ned contribution program. In the current de…ned bene…t system, individuals are given insurance against life span risk as they receive retirement 32 bene…ts as long as they are alive. On the other hand, a switch to a de…ned contribution retirement program can be designed to provide the same insurance if the funds in the individuals'accounts are required to be annuitized.
However, as Diamond (1998) points out, political feasibility necessitates that the accounts'of the deceased be transferred to their estates. Diamond In this paper, we quantitatively evaluate the welfare e¤ects of reforming social security by introducing a PSA with and without mandatory annuitization in an economic environment with bequests and borrowing constraints.
Our setup allows us to assess whether mandatory saving or mandatory annuitization of accumulated PSA wealth at retirement is welfare enhancing, and if so, for what type of individuals.
Our setup is a two-sided altruistic framework where social security provides insurance against individual income and lifespan uncertainty. The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals that di¤er in income and lifetime expectancy. Following Laitner (1992), we specify preferences so that individuals derive utility from their own lifetime consumption and from the felicity of their predecessors and descendents. In this framework, an unfunded social security system competes with family insurance to insure households members for the two types of risk mentioned above. The family insurance takes the form of intervivos transfers and bequests. Overall, the economy consists of a rich set of households.
This framework is well suited to consider the annuity role of social security for single individuals versus for households where families also provide annuity insurance to their members. Our goal is to quantitatively evaluate the proposed reforms along the lines of PSAs with or without mandatory annuitization of PSA wealth at retirement in this setup where some households have higher desire to annuitize wealth than others. We calibrate our economy to the U.S. economy, use numerical, discrete state-space methods to solve the households recursive decision problem, and restrict attention on steady-states under various pension system.
Our main …ndings can be summarized as follows:
A majority of households prefer a PSA reform (with or without mandatory annuitization) over the current PAYG pension system. Aggregate capital, output, and consumption, as well as individuals'lifetime wel-34 fare, are higher in the reformed pension system.
Mandatory annuitization bene…ts most households.
In light of these …ndings, structuring the social security reform along a two-tiered system with a safety net for low income households, and allowing all households to accumulate retirement wealth faster through PSAs, and …nally, requiring some level of annuitization of this wealth appear welfare improving for most households.
